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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF 'I'HE
S'I'1\TE

OF UTi.H

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
Case No.
15512

-vsROY J. TIPPETTS,
Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
Appellant was charged with robbery in ·violation
of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-301

(Supp. 1977).

DISPOSITION OF THE LOWER COURT
Appellant was tried before a jury and found guilty
of one count of robbery on October 4, 1977, in the Fourth
Judicial District, in and for Utah County, State of Utah,
the Honorable J. Robert Bullock presiding.

On October 21,

1977, appellant was sentenced for the indeterminate term,
not less than one year nor more than fifteen years, in the
Utah State Prison.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent seeks affirmation of the verdict and
judgment of the lower court.
S'l'ATEMENT OF Fl>CTS
On August 30, 1977, at approximately 12:30 a.m.
the Riverbend Lounge, located in Provo Canyon, was robbed by
two men.

Four eyewitnesses at the scene described the

ev~b

I

as follows:
Two men entered the bar, asked where the restroom
was, asked for a beer, asked where the cigarette machine 1vas,
then exited (T.14,27-28).

The two then returned to the bar,

one holding "something hard" at the back of a customer,
Joseph E. Faux, who was seated at the bar (T.14,29,36,40) and
the other went to the bar-:.ender, Lori Elliot, and demanded
money (T.15,29,35,40).
into Faux's ribs

The man who "stuck something hard"
I

(T.29) was positively identified by the four'

eyewitnesses at the lounge as appellant Tippetts
39).

(T.13,28,36,

They all testified that appellant Tippetts wore a red '

shirt, brown vest, levis and a cowboy hat (T.13,28,36,39).
Utah Highway Patrol Trooper John N. Moon, who arrested the
defendants, also testified that on the night of August 30,
appellant Tippets was so dressed

(T. 4 7) .

A similar positive

i

identification was made on co-defendant Lopez and the clo~~I
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he worc--footboll sweat shirt with the numbers "78" on it,

cap ana levis

(T.13-14,28,36,38,47).

Elliot testif ied--and the three other bar partons
corroborated her testimony--that appellant Tippetts told Faux
"don't move or I'll put one of these through you into the
bar"

(T.15,29) and that co-defendant Lopez first demanded

$50, then $100, then all the money in the cash register (T.15,
29,35,40).

A later accounting showed that $314 was taken

from the lounge.

Elliot also testified, and was supported

by the other three witnesses, that co-defendant Lopez then
pulled the phone cord out of the wall, threatened anyone who
tried to follow and the two sped away in a white, rusty old
Ford (T.16-17,33,36,41).

Elliot then called the police on

a pay phone and she gave a description of the car and suspects
to the Highway Patrol (T.16-17).
the general vicinity

Trooper Moon, who was in

responded to the call and apprehended

the suspected vehicle (T.44-46).

Four persons were in the

car and Trooper Moon testified that he recovered and marked
$250 hidden in the front grill of the car and on the floor
of the back seat (T.49, State's Exhibit 1).

The four occupants

of the car were identified as Roy J. Tippetts, Gilbert Matthew
Lopez

(aka Henry Lopez because he gave officers the name of

"Henry Lopez", belonging to one of his brothers, when he was
arrested) and two of defendant Lopez's brothers (T.52-54).

-3-
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The two defendants were arrested and charged witl
the robbery.

Both were assigned counsel from the Utah Counh

Public Defenders' Office to represent them at trial--Lopez
was assigned Shelden R. Carter and Tippetts was assigned
Michael D. Esplin.

The day before trial began, Carter

became ill and was unable to attend the trial (T.1-2).

In

a pre-trial conference in Judge Bullock's chambers, Lopez,
Esplin, who fully represented appellant's interests, and the

I

judge discussed the possible actions that could be taken: con-I
I

I

tinuance or proceed with the trial using Esplin as joint
counsel

(T.1-4).

When asked about a possible conflict of

interest, Esplin replied, ".
flict.

. I don't know of any real con-

.I don't know now of a conflict between Mr. Tippetts

and Mr. Lopez."

(T.2}.

I

Esplin further stated that he was

well versed on Carter's strategy for trial and knew Carter
had not planned on calling any witnesses (T.3).

Both Carur

and Esplin had discussed the case together (T. 3) .

In fact,

Esplin had previously represented both defendants at preliminary hearing

(T.3).

quickly with the trial.

Lopez indicated his desire to proc~
Upon the basis of these representa·

tions of Esplin and with Esplin's and Lopez's full
Judge Bullock ruled that the trial would proceed as

compl~~~
I

scheduled (T.4}.
I'

-4-
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At the close of the trial the only on the record
objection

~he

defense raade was the judge's refusal to

include a jury instruction on a lesser included offense of
theft (T.60,64).

The jury returned a verdict of guilty for

both defendants.

Appellant Tippetts now appeals that

conviction.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
APPELLANT H.Z'\S NOT SHm·m A CONFLICT OF INTEREST
:CXISTI:D BETlvEEN CO·-DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT IN THEIR DUAL
REPRESENTATION AND HAS NOT SHOWN HE l·/AS DENIED EFFECTIVE
ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL.
Appellant bases much of the strength of his appeal
on the very recent Supreme Court case of Holloway v. Arkansas,
U.S.

(1978), 23, er.L. 3001 and the landmark Supreme

Court decision of Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60 (1942).
Yet a careful reading of those two opinions reveals stark
dissimilarities between them and the present case.

In

Holloway, the defendants' attorney, who was appointed by the
court to represent all three defendants, made two motions-one two and a half weeks before the trial and another the
day of the trial--for separate counsel.

Harold Hall, the

defendants' attorney, had received information from one of
the co-defendants that he would run the risk of representing

-5-
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conflicting interests.

The court denied both motions.

In the Glasser case, a weak case against Glasser
was presented by the government and the defendant strongly
objected to being represented by counsel for his codefendant.

The possible conflict of interest was laid out

before the court by the defendants' counsel, Stewart, and
was duly recorded on the record.
separate counsel be appointed.

Stewart requested that
The request was denied.

However in the present case, neither appellant,
co-defendant nor Esplin felt a conflict of interest problem
existed (T.2).

No one actively sought separate counsel, as

seen in Hollaway and Glasser.

Also in Holloway and GlassN,

the records reported that the conflicts of interest indeed
hampered Hall and Stewart in the presentation of the cases.
No such hindering conflict is reflected in the record in the
present case.
Glasser sets forth an important procedure which
must be followed in determining whether a conflict of interes
problem will arise during the trial.

The Supreme Court rul~

that the conflict must be "brought home to the court" by the
party who believes he is being denied effective counsel.
U.S. at 71,76.

-6-
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Jb

0lasscr has been interpreted differently in various
jurisdictions 'iit:h regard to this duty of aripellant to bring
to the court's attention a possible conflict.

As noted in

John Stewart Geer's article, "Representation of Multiple
Criminal Defendants: Conflicts of Interest and the Professional Responsibilities of the Defense Attorney," 62 Minn.
Law Review 119, 138-139,
"Even if some evidence of the divided
loyalties of counsel is apparent from the
record, the obstacles that a convicted defendant must hurdle to obtain reversal are
greater in some jurisdictions than others.
Varied interpretations of the Supreme
Court's ambiguous decision in Glasser
account for much of this disparity.
Regardless of the standard employed, however,
an examination of results actually reached
reveals that some courts are less disposed
to reversing convictions in multiple representation cases than are others. For
example, some courts confronted with a
record containing substantial or overwhelming evidence against an appellant
have concluded that defense counsel's multiple representation did not result in a
demonstratable conflict; others have rejected
the notion that the substantiality of a
government's case renders a defendant's
constitutional claim less compelling.
These disparties suggest that a defendant's
fortunes in a sixth amendment appeal may
hinge, in large part, on a fortuity of a
sympathetic appeals court."
The question of the severity

of the standard in Utah was

resolved by this court in the case of State v. Johnson, 25
Utah 2d 46, 475 P.2d 543

(1970).

-7-

The court, interpreting
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the Glasser standard, determined that when a convicted
defendant attacks the validity of the trial proceeding,
"the burden is upon him to show
that there was some inpropriety and
that there is at least some liklihood that there was unfairness to
him.
. .475 P.2d at 546. (Emphasis
added)
In Holloway, petitioners raised the claim that their
representation by a single appointed attorney, over their
objection, violated the federal constitutional guarantee of
effective assistance of counsel.

Thus, the defendants there

met the strict standard of the Utah court (advancing a claiE!ed
conflict by petitioners) and would therefore, a fortiori,
meet any less severe standards of other jurisdictions.
Because defendants' and counsel's objections to the

appoin~

ment of a single attorney were timely and the motions were
denied, the precise Uolloway holding is not unexpected:

"We hold that the failure, in the
face of the representations made by
counsel weeks before trial and again
before the jury was empanelled, deprived
petitioners of the guarantee of
'assistance of counsel.'" 23 Cr. L.
at 3003-3004.
Respondent submits that the Holloway holding is
distinguishable from the present case and that it not be
given a broader interpretation than its narrow facts and
circumstances allow.

In fact, two important limitations

-8-
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to Holloway are stressed in Holloway itself.
cm~hasises

The court

that attorneys, as officers of the court are, first,
ttin the best position professionally
and ethically to determine when a conflict
of interest exists or will probably develop
in the course of a trial [citation omitted] .
Second, defense attorneys have the obligation upon discovering a conflict of interests,
to advise the court at once of the problem.
Finally, attorneys are officers of the court,
and 'when they address the judge solemnly
upon the matter before the court, their
declarations are virtually made under oath.'
[citation omitted]
We find these considerations persuasive.tt 23 Cr. at 3004.
In the present matter, Esplin, after careful and

deliberate consideration, determined that there would not be
any conflict of interest (T.1-4)_ and the court accepted his
judgment.

Esplin related that both he and Carter had worked

together on the case and Esplin knew how Carter had planned
on presenting Lopez's case (T.3); he therefore concluded he
would effectively represent both defendants without a conflict of interest.
The .Holloway court also limits its holding to exclude
bad faith rnanuverings by defense attorneys.

In response to

Arkansas' concern that the court's holding would place too
much authority in defense attorneys' hands and undermine the
trial court's power, the Supreme Court responded by asserting
that Arkansas
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"has an obvious interest in avoiding such abuses.
But our holding does
not undermine that interest. When an
untimely motion for separate counsel
is made for dilatory purposes, our
holding does not impair the trial
court's ability to deal with counsel
who resort to such tactics [citations
omitted). Nor does our holding preclude a trial court from exploring the
adequacy of the basis of defense
counsel's representations regarding a
conflict of interests without improperly
requiring disclosure of the conf idential communications of the client.
[citation omitted)
In this case the
trial court simply failed to take
adequate steps in response to the
repeated motions, objections and
representations made to it, and no
prospect of dialtory practices was
present to justify that failure."
23
Cr. L. at 3004.
Respondent

suggest~

that this second abuse which

Arkansas was fearful of is being evidenced in the present
case.

That is, a defense attorney's dilatory action and

u~

timely motions are being employed as the foundation in the
present appeal.

For no conflict of interest objections were

raised pre-trial or during trial.

No such conflict problem

appears anywhere in the court record.

The only bas is of the

alleged conflict lies in the post-trial affidavits appearing
in Appellant's Brief (Appendices A and B).

However, these

affidavits appear as purely self-serving devices

(See

Respondent's Brief, Appendix A).
One other important aspect of the Holloway decision i
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i~

that joint representation
"is not per se violative of constitutional guarantees oi effective
assistance of counsel. This principle
recognizes that in some cases multiple
defendants can appropriately be represented by one attorney; indeed, in
some cases, certain advantages might
accrue from joint representation.
In
Mr. Justice Frankfurter's view: 'Joint
representation is a means of insuring
against reciprocal recrimination. A
common defense often gives strength
against a common attack.'" Glasser v.
United States, supra, 315 U.S., at 92
(dissenting).
23 Cr. L. at 3003.
This principle has been observed by numerous other

courts, State v. Jeffery, 515 P.2d 364,

(Mont. 1973); Common-

wealth v. LaFleur, 1 Mass. App. 827, 296 N.E.2d 517
In State v. George, 100 Ariz. 350, 414 P.2d 730

(1973).

(1966) the

court in a remarkably similar fact situation refused a convicted defendant's claim that he was denied effective counsel
when both defendants initially had counsel but, by arrangement, only one attorney represented the defendants at trial.
Appellant

George raised Glasser v. United States, supra, as

his basis for appeal.

The Arizona high court, however,

rejected the appeal saying:
"(w]e find the Glasser case clearly
distinguishable.
In that case the
trial court appointed an attorney already in the case to also def end Glasser
prior to the commencement of the trial.
The possibility of inconsistent interests
of the co-defendants was shown the trial
court, and it was shown that 'Glasser
wished the benefit of the undivided
assistance of counsel of his own choice.'
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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None of these facts arc present in the
principal case.
Defendant has failed
to show any conflict of interest between
himself and the other defendant repres~nte~
by his attorney. [citations omitted] The
defendants were identified as two of the
persons responsible for the crimes; were
arrested together and charged with the
same crimes; and part of the stolen ite~s
were found in their possession.
The only conflict was that George
desired to establish an alibi.
.Had
defendant made his desires known as to
.his intent to call alibi witnesses
prior to the trial, the trial court, in
its discretion, could have accorrunodated
his request.
We will not disturb a trial court's
denial of a motion for a new trial unless
it appears there has been an abuse of discretion.
[citations omitted)
We cannot
say the trial court abused its discretion
in refusing to grant a new trial in this
case.
Judgment affirmed."

414 P.2d at 734.

In the present case a very similar situation exists:/
defendants have been positively identified by four persons atl
the Riverbend Lounge as the two who held up the bar

(T.13,28,

36,39); the defendants were arrested together and charged
with the crime

I

(T.52-54); part of the stolen money was fou~

in their possession (T.49); appellant now wishes to establi~i
an alibi and claims alibi witnesses were improperly

exclud~

(Appellant's brief p. 18,21 and Appendices A and B); and
the trial court has ruled with its discretion as to a
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!

potential conflict of interest (T.1-4).

Thus the two cases

arc most similar.
Other cases point out that joint representation
"is not per se violative of constitutional guarantees,"
Holloway, supra.
P.2d 975

In Barron v. State, 7 Ariz. App. 223, 437

(1968), the court ruled that the
"appellants did not indicate in
their petition the existence of any
conflict or potential conflict which
would impose a duty upon defense
counsel to suggest that independent
legal representation be afforded to
appellants. The appellants cannot
complain of denial of assistance of
counsel where no showing of conflict
has been made [citation omitted] .
The mere fact that the same attorney
represented all the defendants does
not ipso facto warrant habeas corpus
relief."
437 P.2d at 977.
Effective assistance is not determined by equal

numerical ratios of counsel to defendants.
201 Kan. 101, 439 P.2d 383,

State v. Little,

(1968), is illustrative of this

point.
"Defendant claims the trial court
erred in appointing the same attorney
to represent both him and his brother
because their defenses were interrelated and the defendant was thereby
denied effective assistance of counsel.
This contention is without merit.
The record does not support these
statements. Counsel for appellant
fails to point out in what particular
trial counsel failed to fully and
fairly represent the defendant and
we fail to discern such a failure."
439 P.2d at 387.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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In order for a claim of joint representation
resulting in ineffective counsel to be valid, defendants
must prove their assertions.
Woods, 544 F.2d 242,

Thus, in United States v.

(CA6, 1976), the constitutional re-

presentation was outlined as follows:
"The Sixth Amendment guarantees the
right to counsel in criminal proceedings
and a conflict of interest on the part
of counsel representing two defendants
may deprive the accused of the effective
assistance of counsel. Glasser v. United
States, 315 U.S. 60, 62 S.Ct. ~57, 86 L.
Ed. 680 (1942). However, the mere fact of
joint representation does not per se
establish a denial of the effective assistance of
counsel [citation omitted]. Our court requires a party
claiming that joint representation resulted in
a conflict of interest to demonstrate that
some actual prejudice resulted to him."
544 F.2d at 268, 269.
The Woods court then concluded by asserting that
"[w]e find no actual conflict of
interest preventing adequate representation of appellant Blair. Moreover, it
would be especially inappropriate for
us to infer prejudice from the mere fact
of joint representation where, as was
the case here, the defendant was advised
of the possibility of a conflict of
interest, and of his right to sever his
case and be represented by separate
appointed counsel."
544 F.2d at 269.
Clearly defendant Lopez was informed of his right
to continue the trial (T.1-4) and it can be inferred that
Esplin, appellant's original sole counsel, fully explain~
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the situation to appellant before the pre-trial conference.
This can be inferred by Esplin's statements to the court
(T.2,3) with respect to his assurance that there would be
no conflict of interest problem when Lopez decided to go
ahead with the trial on October 4th using Esplin as his
counsel, Judge Bullock asked Esplin:
"THE COURT: Do you feel that you
can do that, Mr. Esplin?
Mn. ESPLIN:
I think so, your Honor.
I don't know that there's any real conflict.
IVhen I brought that up, that's
[sic) the possibility of conflict, I
don't know now of a conflict between Mr.
Tippetts and Mr. Lopez. The only thing
I would point out to the Court, there
may be a difference in the way the -THE COURT:
is concerned?

As far as testifying

MR. ESPLIN: As far as testifying
i·s concerned. At this point I .don't.
THE COURT:
Do you feel that you
could properly advise both of them in
that regard?
MR. ESPLIN:
I believe so, your
Honor.
I did represent Mr. Lopez at
the Preliminary Hearing and also Mr.
Tippetts.
THE COURT:
So you are conversant
with the facts in the case and what
they claim to be, the facts and so on?
MR. ESPLIN:
Honor.

That's correct, your
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THE COURT:
And as far as you know
there aren't any other witnesses that
Mr. Lopez should have present or anything of that nature?
MR. ESPLIN: No, your Honor, I
don't know of any.
THE COURT:
Now, Mr. Carter was
working on the case right up until
yesterday so that he would have subpoenaed any witnesses -MR. ESPLIN:

That's right.

THE COURT:
--that he felt at
least would aid in Mr. Lopez' defense?
MR. ESPLIN: Yes. And we discussed the possibility of a couple other
witnesses, calling a couple of witnesses,
and discounted the doing that, both Mr.
Carter and myself."
(T.2-3)
Thus, it is clear that Esplin in no way felt a

con-

flict of interest would arise; that he believed he could

represent both defendants adequately; and that he and Carter
had discussed trial strategy prior to Carter becoming ill so
Esplin was well aware of both defendants' possible defenses.
No mention was made of the alleged conflict which

appella~

now claims Esplin had been informed of in September, 1977.
Respondent submits that no such conflict as alleged existed
prior to or during the trial and defendants were
repr€sented

(See Respondent's Appendix A).

-16-
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effective~

POI!TT II
T~rn

\'iHETIIER

TRI7l,L COUc?.T

DE~'Et:JDJ\llTS

~1.E'J'

I'l'S DUTY OF ASCER'rAINING

\70ULD BE DEPIUVED OF THEIR SIXTH

AMEl'iDMEllT RIGHTS BY JOIN'l' REPRESEN'fATION.

In both Glasser v. United States, supra, and
Holloway v. Arkansas_, supra, the United States Supreme Court
stresses the fact that the trial judge has the responsibility
to assure that the accused receives all the protections of
law.

In Glasser the court said:
"Upon the trial judge rests the
duty of seeing that the trial is conducted with solicitude for the
essential rights of the accused.
The trial court should protect the
right of an accused to have the assistance of counsel." 315 U.S. at 71

Later in the opinion, the court again emphasizes this important
trial court function and cautions trial judges against
random dismissal of a counsel's conflict of interest claim.
"Of equal importance with the duty
of the court to see that an accused
has the assistance of counsel is its
duty to refrain from embarrassing
counsel in the defense of an accused
by insisting, or indeed, even suggesting, that counsel undertake to concurrently represent interests which
might diverge from those of his first
client, when the possibility of that
divergence is brought home to the
court." 315 U.S. at 76.

-17-
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These same instructions to trial court judges are echoed
in the Hollm-wy opinioE. 23 Cr. r.. at 300t.
In the instant case, Judge Bullock should be comr~ended

for his thorough examination into potential problems

with Esplin acting as joint counsel for the

defendan:~s

('l'.1-4),

None of the cautions or Harnings that the Glasser and llollowa\
opinions detail as possible trial court abuses are evidenced
in the present case.
The federal court system has ado?ted this same
responsibility for its trial courts.

In United States v.

Foster, 469 F.2d 1 (CAl, 1972), the court not only

forceful~

sets the requirements for trial judge examinations, but also
details how such an examination will limit a defendant's
ability to attack joint representation on appeal.
"Under those circumstances, where
trial commences after the publication
date of this opinion, it shall be the
duty of the trial court, as early in
the litigation as practicable, to comment on some of the risks confronted
where defendants are jointly represented to insure that defendants are aware
of such risks, and to inquire diligently
whether they have discussed the risks
with their attorney, and whether they
understand that they may retain separate
counsel, or if qualified, may have such
counsel appointed by the court and paid
for by the government..
.There may be
unusual circumstances where,.
.the
court may exercise its discretion to
pursue the inquiry with defendants and
their counsel on the record but in
chambers.
-18-
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If the court has carried out
this duty of inquiry, then to the
extent a dcfcn~ant later attemots
to attack his conviction on gr~unds
of conflict of interest arising from
joint representation he will bear
a heavy burden indeed of persuading
us that he ~as, for that reason, dep_rived of a fair tria_l.
~·Jhen a satisfactory in0ury does
not appear on the record, the burden
Of-persuasion will shift to the
-government.
If the case comes before
us on direct appeal, the government
will be required to demonstrate from
the record that prejudice to the defendant was ir.1probable." 469 F.2d at
4,5 (Emphasis added)

Appellant relies on Foster to stand for the proposition that "a lack of satisfactory judicial inquiry" into
joint representation problems automatically shifts the
burden of persuasion to the government.
p.14).

(Appellant's Brief,

However, a careful reading of the case reveals that

the burden shifts only if "a satisfactory inquiry does
not appear on the record."

Foste£, supra. at 5.

Appellant

urges that the burden is now on respondent to prove no conElict of interest existed.

Respondent contends, however,

that inasmuch as the trial judge's careful examination into
the possible conflict is well documented on the record (T.1-4)
no such burden shifts to respondent.

On the contrary, the

Foster decision holds that when such an inquiry is on the
record, appellant--it is worth repeating--"will bear a heavy
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burden indeed of persuading us that he was, for that reason,
deprived of a fair t.rial."

4.69 F.2d at 5.

In a remarkably similar case to the present-. matter,
the Second Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that when
appellant's counsel

beca~e

ill during trial, the trial court

could properly make a determination whether to continue the
trial by having counsel for co-defendant act as appellant's
attorney or appoint separate counsel.
330 F.2d 316

!Jnited States v. Dard 1,

(CA2, 1964), cert denied 379 U.S. 845

(1964).

The trial court ruled that such an
"[a]ssignrrent '-''Ould not give rise
to a conflict of interests, but
indicated that if a conflict were to
arise, the appropriate precautions
would be taken."
330 F.2cl at 335.
The Circuit Court then continued by ruling that while
"the right to counsel is absolute,
its exercise must be 'subject to the
necessities of sound judicial adminis-tration.' [citation omitted]; and
where there appears to be no conflict,
the court may, in its discretion,
assign to a defendant the attorney of
a co-defendant..
.Such an assignment is not, in itself, a denial of
effective assistance of counsel.
Since Glasser v. United States [supra]
it has been clear that some confllct of interest must be shown before an
appellant can successfully claim that
representation by an attorney also
engaged by another defendant deprived
him of his right to counsel." 330 F.2d
at 335.
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These same circuDstances are present in the
inst.0nt case:

co-defendant's counsel became ill during

the course of the litigation, the trial court made a determination that appellant's counsel could effectively represent
both defendants, and no clear showing was made at the inchambers conference as to a conflict of interest.
It is respondent's position that Judge Bullock
made a proper and adequate investigation into possible conflict problems and he discharged well his duty of inquiry
into whether a joint counsel assignment \·10uld deprive
appellant of his Sixth Amendment rights.
POINT III
BY Rl\ISING 'I'HE l\LLEGED COIJFLICT OF INTEREST CL/UM
FOR THE FIRST TIME ON i\PPEAL, APPELLANT HAS WAIVED THAT BASIS
OF APPEAL BECAUSE :!:T WAS NOT Tll-11".LY RAISED.
The Holloway decision twice refers to the importance
of raising objections to joint representation in a timely
fashion.

The thrust of that decision, which the dissenting

judges had great reservations about, can be seen in the court's
interpretation of Glasser.
"We read the Court's opinion in Glasser,
however, as holding that whenever a trial court improperly requires joint representation over timely objection reversal is
automatic." 23 Cr. L. at 3005.

-21-
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To soften the blow of the harsh result of "automatic
reversal," the court

assuag~a

the

dis3~ntPYS

b~

e~ph~si~ing

that such a result would occur only under very narrow circumstances.

With regard to the "automatic reversal" rule,

the court said by
"requiring a defendant to show that
a conflict of interests--which he and
his counsel tried to avoid by timely
objections to the joint representation-prejudiced him in some specific fashion
would not be susceptible to intelligent,
even-handed application." 23 Cr. L. at
3005

These two excerpts point out that in order for
appeal courts to look favorably upon a claimed conflict of
interest and ineffective counsel reotions, such objections
must be "timely."

Otherwise, the objections on appeal will

"be susceptible to intelligent, even-handed application."
The Supreme Court of Illinois has ruled that where
a defendant at trial made no objection to being represented
jointly with his co-defendant, and where there was no suggestion by either defendant that a conflict of defenses
existed, the objection raised on appeal alleging such was
"completely unsupported by this
record which contain[ed] no evidence
of the theory.
.relied upon. McCasle's
defense was his uncorroborated testirnonal
alibi.
.Additionally, there is no showing that defendant was prejudiced by
counsel's representation of both him and
his co-defendant.
.we ought not to
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dj sturb a jud~ent _on the basis of
conjectural or speculative conflicts
b~br?en thP interests of co-defendants
whichare envisioned for the firo;t
tim~appea;h.
People v. McCasle,
35 Ill.2d 552, 221 N.E.2d 227, 230
(1966) (Emphasis added)
Much the same situation is presently before the
court.

Appellant comes before the appellate court only now

waiving the banner of conflict of interest at this late
date.

No mention was made of such an objection at trial.

No alibi testimony or denied defense witnesses objection can
be found in the record.

Compare this stark absence with

the record in the Holloway case where, when a testifying codefendant made

a statement so startling and incriminating

to appellant from the witness stand, appellant, Holloway,
jumps to his feet to make a pro se objection.

Other recorded

examples of the conflict are evident as well.

No such attempt

by appellant is present in the instant case.

On point here is

the case of Coates v. Lawrence, 46 F.Supp. 414 {1942), where
the District Court held
"[i]t is a familiar rule of
evidence that silence, when there is
a duty to speak, is tantamount to,
and often creates an estoppel against,
or waiver of the right of, later saying otherwise."
46 F.Supp. 424
Such a rule of silence being interpreted as a
waiver, however, is a severe result and must only be triggered
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under circumstances where the defendant was
giving up a right.

cognizan~

of

As is stated in People v. Johnson, 74

Cal. Rptr. 889, 450 P.2d 265 (1969)
"[t]he determination of whether
there has been an intelligent waiver
of the right to counsel must depend,
in each case, upon the particular
facts and circumstances surrounding
that case, including the background,
experience, and conduct of the accused."
450 P.2d at 269.
The California court has further defined this
principle in People v. Mattson, 51 Cal.2d 777, 336 P.2d 937,
(1959) by outlining the particular circumstances required
for a defendant to have properly waived the claim of denial
of effective counsel on appeal.

The waiver is determined by

"such matters as the intricacy of
the accusatory pleading, the complexity
of the law as to the offense charged
and included offenses, defendant's
intelligence, education, experience
(including familiarity with the criminal
law derived from prior prosecutions),
youth, mental and physical health and
emotional condition, the attitude of
the court and the prosecuting officials
and the existence of inflamed public
opinion, and also the severity of the
penalty.
Considering the foregoing
matters, the courts have developed
familiar rules,.
.as to the scope of
an accused's right to representation
by counsel at the trial and in the
antecedent proceedings." 336 P.2d at
946.
One reason courts are reluctant to accept dilato0
objections raised only on appeal is the court's desire to
-24Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

avoid "piecernea_l litigation."
In the California case of Wieczorek v. Texas Co.,
45 Cal.App.2d 450, 114 P.2d 377

(1941), the court rejected

an objection raised first on appeal and ruled
"[i]t is the policy of the law
that litigation shall not be had
in piecemeal and that when a party
has a defense to a pending cause
of action it must be presented
then, otherwise it will be deemed
waived." 114 P.2d at 382.
The same court ruled one year later that if
"the natter was within the
scope of the action, related to
the subject-matter and relevant
to the issue0, sc that it could
have been raised, the judgment
is conclusive on it despite the
fact that it v1as not in fact
expressly plead or otherwise
urged.
.Dilatory tactics in
neglecting to present all points
on a first appeal may often lead
to an ineffective disposition of
the rights of the respective
parties on the vital question of
time limitation.
. In the present
case it might cause confusion.
The courts do not countenance
piecemeal litigation." Ormitz v.
Board of Dental Examiners, 55
cai.App.2a sss, u2 P.2a 212,
275-276 (1942).
Similar confused, piecemeal, dilatory tactics are
present in the instant case.

Respondent urges the court

to rule that appellant has waived his claimed alibi defense
by not raising it at trial.

The attempted defense and
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alleged conflict of interest should be quickly diposed
of by the court as manipulative manuverings.
POINT IV
WHEN DOUBT ARISES AS TO llHETHER EITHER A)
APPELLANT RECIEVED EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL OP B)
A CONFLICT OF INTEREST EXISTED AT TRIAL, 'l'HE QUESTIOfJS
MUST BE RESOLVED BY EXI\.MINING THE

COUl~T

RECORD.

Several Utah Supreme Court cases hold that when

~

appellant is claiming he has been denied effective representation, the court must look to the record to determine if
appellant's contention has merit.

State v. Farnsworth, 13

Utah 2d 103, 368 P.2d 914 (1962); State v. Dodge, 19 Utah
2d 44, 425 P.2d 781 (1967); and State v. Heath, 27 Utah 2d
13, 492 P.2d 978

(1972).

Perhaps Justice Crockett best

summed up this frequent objection raised by appellants in

I

II

the recent case of State v. Harris, 30 Utah 2d 354, 517 P.2d
1313 (1974), when he said:
"In regard to the defendant's contention that he was denied effective
counsel: we are impelled to remark
that it is nothiny less than shameful
that our law seems to have degenerated
to a point where whenever an accused
is convicted of crime, the charge of
incompetency of counsel is, with ever
increasing frequency, leveled at
capable attorneys who have given
entirely adequate service, when the

-26--
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I

I
I
I

real difficulty was that he had
a guilty client.
In this respect
also defendant had his entitlement of adequate representation
by capable and conscientious
counsel." 517 P.2d at 1315
Notlling in the present record indicates that
appellant was denied effective counsel.

On the contrary,

the record shows that counsel very methodically and deliberately
worked in appellant's best interests (T.1-4, especially).
This same analysis of the record is needed to
ansv1er appellant's charge that a conflict of interest existed
between him and co-defendant Lopez.
437 F.2d 1191,

United States v.

Gallagh~r,

(CA7, 1971), stands for the proposition that

"The existence of a conflict of
interest, to warrant the result here
sought, must be founded on something
more than mere speculation or surmise.
We perceive nothing in this record
which demonstrates the existence of
any real conflict of interest between
the defendants. And counsel had
ample opportunity to make such a
showing if such conflict existed."
437 F.2d at 1194
The court denied defendant's motion for a new trial
and affirmed his conviction.

State courts follow the same

standard of examination of record.

In

~~ate

v. Kennedy, 8

Wash. App. 633, 508 P.2d 1386 (1973), a defendant appealed
his conviction on grounds of both ineffective counsel and
conflict of interest.

The court rejected defendant's claim
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.
that he need only establish " a possibility of conflict
or pre-judice" and went on to rule that
"when we revie\v the proceedings
in this trial court we are not confined to the application of such a
speculative standard. Concededly, in
judging the effectiveness of counsel
we must indulge in some sort of
speculation as we see only the 'tip
of the iceberg' in the record before
us. [citation omitted). However, we
do have the verbatim transcript of
the proceedings in the trial court.
Accordingly, if we can find anything
in the record which indicates that
there is a possibility that the defendant may have been actually prejudiced, he has been denied his right
to effective counsel. [citation omitted)
We do not find even a possibility
that the defendant may have been
actually prejudiced." 508 P.2d at
1389.

In searching the record of the present case, the
only reference to a conflict of interest problem appears
at the pretrial discussion in Judge Bullock's chambers (T.
1-4).

After carefully considering the matter Lopez, Esplin,

the trial judge, and appellant--through the proxy representa·
tion of Esplin acting in his behalf--all agreed that there
would be no conflict problem.

In Esplin's own words, the

I
I

decision was made that, ".

. I don't know now of a conflict

between Mr. Tippetts and Mr. Lopez. " (T. 2) .
In appellant's reliance on Glasser v. United

Sta~,[

I
-28Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

~-'

is

one important ruling of the Supre:".e Court's decision

~bsent

from appel1ant's brieE.

In determining a court's

role in reviewing a conviction, the high court rules
"[i)t is not for us to weigh
the evidence or to determine the
credibility of witnesses. The
verdict of a jury must be sustained
if there is substantial evidence,
taking the view most favorable to
the Government, to support it."
315 U.S. at 30.
A reviewing court, therefore, may only look at the

court record and evidence presented at trial and must affirm
the conviction if ''substantial evidence" supports it.

Appellant

would have this court rely upon two self-serving affidavits
attached as appendices to his brief as the sole basis for
establishing a conflict of interest between the two defendants.

Utah case law is very clear with regard to the

unacceptablility of "facts" stated in briefs as bases for
appeal.

The Utah Court in Watkins v. Simonds, 14 Utah 2d 406,

385 P.2d 154

(1963), stated:

"this court cannot consider

facts stated in the briefs which may be true but absent in
the official record."
~oresters

385 P.2d at 155.

See also Cooper v.

Underwriters, Inc., 123 Utah 215, 257 P.2d 540

(1953); Skyline v. Data-cap, 545 P.2d 512 (Utah, 1976).
The reliance by appellant on such improper "facts"

-29-
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discolors his entire brief--for when appellant has no sound
basis on which to build his conflict of interest review,
the whole appeal must fail.
CONCLUSION
Respondent contends that appellant was not denied
effective assistance of counsel and that no conflict of
interest existed between co-defendant Lopez and appellant
Tippetts (See Respondent's Appendix A).

It must again be

stressed that joint representation is not per se violative
of Sixth Amendment rights.
The trial court properly dealt with and fulfilled
its duty of ascertaining whether defendants would be deprived
of their constitutional rights.
Respondent submits that appellant has waived his
right to object to his dual representation because the motioo
has not been timely raised.
A search of the official trial record is the sole
basis for resolving claims of either conflict of interest m
ineffective trial counsel.

It is respondent's position that

such a search will result in finding no basis for appellant's
claims.
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Respondent asserts that the rulings of the lower
court were proper and prays that the conviction be
affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,

ROBERT B. F..1\.l'JSON
Attorney General
MICHAEL L. DEAMER
Dep~ty Attorney General
WILLIAM W. BARRETT
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Respondent
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STATE OF UTAH
SALT LAKE Crrv~ UTAH
TilE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
-vs-

A F F I D A V I T.

ROY J. TIPPETTS,
Defendant and Appellant.

llo. 15512

ST JI.TE OF UTAH,

SS.
COUNTY OF UTAH.
MICHAEL D. ESPLIN, being first duly sworn
according to law, deposes and says:
1.

That I am the defense counsel who repre-

sented Roy J. Tippetts and Gilbert M. Lopez
during the course of the trial)

(aka Henry Lopez

in the above entitled action

in the District Court in and for the Fourth Judicial District,
Utah County, Utah, on the 4th day of October, 1977.
2.

That there was not a conversation as

alleged by Appellant's friend in her Affidavit attached to
Appellant's brief (Appendix B).

No such discussions of a

possible alibi for Appellant was ever held in my office during
September, 1977.

No such conversations with Joy Anderson,

and Sandra Gibson was held in my office prior to trial.

A

conversation did take place with Appellant's sister after the
trial had been held wherein she alleged a purported alibi for
Appellant.
Dated this Joth day of June, 1978.
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MICHAEL D,. ESPi'IN '

Page 2

SUBSCRIBED and SWORN to hefore me this

J(;"j}_

day of June, 1978.

·,..

NOTl\RY PUBLIC
Residing at:

{( ~?j

{,(-

My Commission Expires:

j

I
j

I

I)
I

I
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